

# Effect of Budgetary Participation on the Budgetary Slack with Information Asymmetry, Environmental Uncertainty, and Budget Emphasis as Variables Moderation

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**Abstract:** The objective of this study is to examine the influence of budgetary participation on budgetary slack. The moderating effects of information asymmetry, environmental uncertainty and budget emphasis are also being identified on the relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack. The population in this study is 27 SKPD (regional working unit) in the government of South Sulawesi Province, with the number of respondents are as many as 105. Research data is collected using census sampling method and analyzed with Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA). The results shows that the budgetary participation has a positive and significant impact on budgetary slack. Meanwhile, the information asymmetry and environmental uncertainty are unable to moderate the relationship between budgetary participation on budgetary slack. In the other hand, budget emphasis is proved to moderate the relationship between the budgetary participation on the budgetary slack.

**Keywords:** Budget Emphasis, Budgetary Participation, Budgetary Slack, Information Asymmetry, Environmental Uncertainty

## I. Introduction

Significant changes to the procedures for preparing the Revenue and Expenditure Budget Regional (APBD) has occurred since regional autonomy was implemented in accordance with the mandate of Law Number 32 The year 2004 was amended by Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government. Change refers to increasing involvement of various parties in the preparation of regional budgets, starting from the head of the region to the Regional Work Unit (SKPD) under it. This matter can be interpreted as increasing employee participation from lower levels in the process budgeting. Fitriatsuri (2005) states the need for budgeting reform or budget reform. This budget reform includes the process of drafting, ratifying, implementing and budgetary accountability.

Another fundamental difference in budget reform is the drafting system a budget that is bottom up. Systems that involve managers or lower leaders this is often referred to as participation. Through this budget reform structure is also applied decentralized organization so that local government has power and responsibility in planning, implementing and monitoring. According to Suartana (2010) budgetary slack occurs because the determination of income is too low (understated) and costs which is too high (overstated). This can have a negative impact on public sector organization misallocation of resources and performance evaluation bias towards the unit of responsibility.

The phenomenon that occurred in the Maros Regency government showed a budget report regional income and regional expenditure in 2013 (Rp. 1,214,119,271,615), 2014 (Rp.920,121,245,914), and 2015 (Rp 1,043,529,935,692) shows the difference between the budgets regional income with the realization of the 2013 regional revenue budget (Rp. 1,133,946,916,197), 2014 (Rp. 879,546,874,920) and 2015 (Rp. 996,256,583,449) with realization levels reaching in 2013 (93.39%), 2014 (95.59%), and 2015 (95.47%). On the budget report regional expenditure in 2013 (Rp. 1,171,923,123,220), 2014 (Rp. 914,246,177,956), and 2015 (Rp. 1,037,790,056,046) also shows the difference in the realization of regional spending in 2013 (Rp. 1,075,948,396,088), 2014 (IDR 856,051,980,027) and 2015 (IDR 946,875,495,027) with a level realization reached 2013 (91.81%), 2014 (93.63%), and 2015 (91.24%). This difference is what allow for indications of budgetary slack. Economical, efficiency, and effectiveness (3E) on performance-based budgeting, not achieving the

budget target is spending efficiency, if it is associated with a traditional budget or cash basis, the target budget is not achieved represents the remaining budget or cash balance which is revenue for the following year called Remaining Calculations Over the Previous Year's Budget (SILPA). The efficiency perceived as an increase in performance that is savings, even though the realization is not is actually the expenditure that has been determined higher than the estimate, which is an indication of budgetary slack on spending.

Budget participation is an approach that can generally improve performance (performance) which can ultimately increase the effectiveness of an organization. As for participation encourage every manager to improve his performance and work harder and consider that the organization's target is its personal target (Bambang, 2002). The concept of asymmetric information is the budget superiors may have more knowledge and insight than subordinates, or vice versa. If the first possibility occurs, demands or motivation will emerge which is greater than superiors to subordinates regarding the achievement of compliant budget targets subordinate is too high. But if the second possibility occurs, the subordinate will declare the target is lower than is possible to achieve. Circumstances where one party have more knowledge and information than others about something called information asymmetry (Suartana, 2010).

Environmental uncertainty is one factor that often causes organizations make adjustments to the condition of the organization with the environment. Uncertainty is perception of members of the organization. A person experiences uncertainty because he feels not have enough information to accurately predict the future. For an organization, the main sources of uncertainty come from the environment, namely competitors, consumers, suppliers, regulators, and the technology needed (Govindarajan, 1986). Other variables that are thought to affect the relationship between budgetary participation in budgetary slack is budget emphasis, that is, companies make the budget one of the most dominant factors in measurement subordinate performance. Rani (2015) explains that the emphasis of the budget is the insistence of superiors to subordinates to carry out a budget that has been well made, in the form sanctions if they are less than the budget target and compensation if they are able to exceed the budget target.

The results of previous studies have inconsistencies between researchers one with yang the other. Like the research conducted by Erina and Suartana (2016), and Kartika (2010) states that budget participation and budget gaps have a relationship positive, i.e. the higher the level of budgetary participation, the potential for budgetary slack the higher it is. While research conducted by Supanto (2010) shows participation budget and budget gaps have a negative relationship. Therefore, research This aims to examine the effects of budget participation, information asymmetry, uncertainty environment, and budget emphasis on budgetary slack.

## **II. Literature Review**

Jensen and Meckling (1976) mention that agency theory is a concept explain the contractual relationship between the principal and the agent, i.e. between two or more individuals, group or organization. In this study, the contingency factor used is asymmetry information, information asymmetry, environmental uncertainty, and budget emphasis. Because at previous studies show different results regarding the relationship between budgetary participation with budgetary slack. Budgetary slack is each business structural officials in local budgeting who are motivated to achieve more targets easy. The instrument used was a questionnaire developed by Dewi (2008) at public sector organization. Budgetary slack indicator is the difference between the budget amount and the estimate best, budget targets, and environmental conditions.

Budget participation is the level of involvement and influence of individuals namely officials structurally involved in regional budgeting. Budget participation variable indicator (X1) according to Triana Maya (2012) measured by 5 indicators, namely; participation in the preparation budget, the ability to provide an opinion in budget organizers, the frequency of giving and ask for opinions or proposals about the budget from superiors, the frequency of superiors asking for opinions when the budget is prepared, it contributes to the preparation of the budget. Budget makes employees or subordinates downplay their productive capabilities, this causes a gap an increasingly large budget between subordinates and superiors. Based on the description above, it can be hypothesized.

H1: budgetary participation has a positive effect on budgetary slack.

Information asymmetry is one of the factors causing budget disbursement. The opportunity to participate is used by agents to make budgetary slacks to improve its performance. The information asymmetry indicator (X2) is measured by 6 indicators. Research instruments in the form questionnaire developed by Novita, et al. (2009) in public sector

organizations, consisting of 6 statement that is, the adequacy of information, suitability of information, namely the quality of information able to meet the needs of the quality of information, the quantity of information that is information able to meet the needs of a wealth of information, and understanding of information. According to Anthony and Govindarajan (2001) and Falikhatun (2007), executives as agents tend to do budgetary slack, because it aims to secure its position in government. While, the legislature as a principal tends to make fake contracts with the executive. Based on description above, then it can be hypothesized.

H2: Information asymmetry reinforces the positive influence of budgetary participation on budgetary slack.

Environmental uncertainty is a condition where one cannot predict conditions the surrounding environment. According to Miliken (1987) uncertainty (X3) is measured by 3 indicators, that is, information relating to circumstances in the future, information about the influence of external factors (technological economic conditions, etc.), non-economic information (market opportunities, price predictions, etc.). According to Govindarajan (1986), the relationship between participation with budgetary slack is positive under conditions of environmental uncertainty low, while the relationship becomes negative in high environmental uncertainty. A subordinates who have high participation in budgeting and facing low environmental uncertainty, will be able to create gaps in the budget, because he is able to overcome uncertainty and be able to predict the future based on description above, then the hypothesis can be formulated.

H3: Environmental uncertainty weakens the positive influence of budgetary participation on budgetary slack.

Budget emphasis is pressure from superiors to subordinates so that the budget can be achieved with sanctions if the budget is not reached and awards if the budget can be achieved. Budget Emphasis Indicators according to Triana Maya (2012) are measured by 6 indicators namely, the amount of income earned, ability and seriousness in paying attention to quality the effort devoted to work, the ability to achieve budget targets, the ability to establish a good relationship with superiors / subordinates, efficiency in responding work and carry out unit operations, ability to socialize with staff groups. Budget emphasis is the insistence of superiors on subordinates to carry out well-made budget. Performance measurement based on the budget already arranged to make subordinates try to obtain profitable variance by creating slack, among others by lowering income and raising costs at the time of preparation budget (Rani, 2015). According to Gamal (2001) if an employee's performance appraisal is very determined by the budget that has been prepared, then subordinates tend to do gaps the budget. When subordinates are stimulated by a large positive reward if work goes beyond budget and subordinates will be subject to negative rewards if it works under the budget, then subordinates will tend to loosen the budget in preparation so that the budget is easy achieved or in other words budgetary slack. Budget emphasis is a tendency to achieve budget success in an easy way. Following is a hypothesis.

H4: Budget emphasis reinforces the positive influence of budgetary participation on budgetary slack.

### **III. Methodology**

This research was conducted at the local government office of Maros Regency. Subject this research namely, structural officials involved in the budgeting process. While the object of research is the effect of budgetary participation on gaps budget, which is moderated by information asymmetry, environmental uncertainty, and budget emphasis. The data source used in this study is primary data collected using the survey method through questionnaires directly to respondents. The sampling technique in this study is sampling census. Census sampling is a sampling technique using all members of the population (Sugiyono, 2012).

Descriptive analysis is used to provide a general description of demographics respondents, then the data quality test is performed using the validity test and reliability. In the item validity test the question is said to be valid or valid if the rcount is greater from rtabel (Nugroho, 2011). While the reliability test is done by statistical tests Cronbach's Alpha. A construct or variable is said to be reliable if it gives value Cronbach Alpha > 0.60 (Ghozali 2002). After the data quality test, then the test is carried out classical assumptions which consist of normality test, heteroscedasticity test, and test multicollinearity. The normality test uses the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, with this test can be known that the data used is normally distributed or not. Heteroscedasticity test performed with the Glejser test. Multicollinearity test seen the value of tolerance, if lower from 0.10, multicollinearity occurs. While the results of the calculation of the VIF value, if has a VIF value of less than 10, then it does not have a multicollinearity problem (Ghozali, 2009). Testing heteroscedasticity in this study by looking at the graph scatterplot, with the criteria raised by Sugiyono (2011) that there is no pattern clear and do not form certain patterns that are regular, for example not bumpy, not widened, and not narrowed.

The last stage is the model of data analysis and hypothesis testing in this study Moderated Regression Analysis. Regression analysis this is a special application of multiple linear regression which contains elements of interaction (multiplication of two or more independent variables). Systematically obtained equation regression:

$$Y = a + \beta_1 X_1 + e \quad (1)$$

$$Y = a + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_1 X_2 + e \quad (2)$$

$$Y = a + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_4 X_3 + \beta_5 X_1 X_3 + e \quad (3)$$

$$Y = a + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_6 X_4 + \beta_7 X_1 X_3 + e \quad (4)$$

Information:

Y = Budgetary Slack

X1 = Budgetary Participation

X2 = Information Asymmetry

X3 = Environmental Uncertainty

X4 = Budget Emphasis

a = Constants

$\beta_1 - \beta_7$  = Coefficient of independent variable regression 1 - 7

e = Error

#### IV. Results

Questionnaires that were distributed could return as a whole as many as 105 questionnaires and everything is filled in completely. Validity test is done to test whether the instrument is valid or not used. The basis of measurement for valid or invalid items for each instrument is with using a validity correlation index of questions, if the product moment correlation is greater than  $r_{table}$ , then each instrument is said to be valid. The number of questionnaire respondents was 105 respondents so that a  $r_{table}$  of 0.30 is obtained from the product moment correlation coefficient for each item the instrument is bigger than  $r_{table}$ . So, each item of the questionnaire is valid. Reliability test assessed through the magnitude of the Cronbach Alpha coefficient. The instrument reliability test results show that all variables have a Cronbach Alpha coefficient greater than 0.60. So, instruments for measure all reliable variables.

Based on the results of normality test data indicate that the significance number is greater from 0.05 for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics. This shows that the data distribution have a normal distribution. Multicollinearity test can be tested using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent variable. Based on the results of multicollinearity test VIF values of each independent variable amounting to less than 10. Thus it can be concluded that among the independent variables does not occur multicollinearity in the linear regression model. In this research, used heteroscedasticity test with Graph test method that is by looking at spreading points that spread randomly, not forming a particular model or pattern which is clearly above and below the number 0 on the Y axis, it can be concluded does not occur heterokedastisitas.

The first hypothesis proposed in this study is that there is a positive influence budgetary participation in budgetary slack. SPSS calculation results are entered into equation as follows;  $Y = 2,140 + 0.521 X_1$ . A Constant value of 2,140 indicates that if the independent variable namely budget participation does not exist then the value of budgetary slack is equal to a constant of 2,140. The results of the regression analysis on the first hypothesis of coefficient  $\beta_1$  (budget participation) of 0.521 The coefficient  $\beta_1$  value of the variable budget participation value positive, meaning that any increase in the participation role of one unit budget will result an increase in budgetary slack by 0.521 units. F test results with values in the annova table or  $\rho$  value  $< \alpha$  0.05 which is 0.000  $<$  0.05, then the budget participation variable is able to influence budgetary slack.

Hypothesis Test Results (t-test) with a significance value of  $\rho$  generated by 0.000 ( $\rho <$  0.05). This means that budgetary participation has a positive effect on budgetary slack. Accordingly Overall linear regression test results indicate that budgetary participation (X1) has a positive effect against budgetary slack. Increasing budget participation will increase slack the budget. Ethermination coefficient /  $R^2$  (adjusted R square)  $\times$  100% = 0.194  $\times$  100% = 19.4%. Score adjusted R square of 0.194. This indicates that X1 only explained 19.40% variation Y variable. While the remaining 80.60% is explained outside the research model.

The results of testing the first hypothesis (H1) in this study indicate that budgetary participation has a positive effect on budgetary slack. This shows that the more individuals participating in budgeting, the higher the opportunities budgetary slack. The practice of budgetary slack contains an understanding of agency theory, namely the existence of a conflict of interest between the agent and the principal. Agency theory explained by Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) is a phenomenon that occurs when superiors delegate authority to subordinates to carry out an authority or task within make decision. Agency relations in the context of local government between superiors and subordinates, where subordinates carry out the planning, implementation and reporting processes regional budgets by forming a Local Government Budget Team (TAPD), while superiors role in carrying out supervision.

The results of this study support research conducted by Andriyani and Hidayati (2010) which shows a positive relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack. In accordance with agency theory, agency relationship between the Regional Head (Regent) and the Head The Office / Office / Agency is the Regional Head (Regent) acting as the principal and Head Office / Office / Agency as an agent. Agents are motivated to develop a career to a level higher and increase compensation in the future. Budgetary slack created by the regional apparatus tends to be a positive budgetary slack, because maintain relations with regional heads and secure jobs and positions or positions in government (Mardiasmo, 2001). The results of this study are not in line with research by Supanto (2010) which shows that budgetary participation has no effect on budgetary slack. The difference between this study and Supanto's (2010) research is due to individuals who differ, the increase or decrease in slack depends on the extent of the individual more selfish or work in the interests of the organization which is actualization from the level of commitment that it has.

The second hypothesis proposed from this study is the influence of budget participation on budgetary slack is strengthened by information asymmetry as a moderating variable. For know whether information asymmetry is a moderating variable, then the coefficient  $\beta_2$  must be significant at alpha 0.05. The results of the SPSS calculation are entered into the equation as the following:  $Y = -1.588 + 0.497 X_1 + 1,114 X_2 - 0.054 X_1.X_2$ . The results of testing the second hypothesis with Moderated regression analysis (MRA). Based on these formulas, it can be seen that the value moderating variable regression coefficient of - 0.054 with a significance value of 0.817, variable moderating was not significant because the probability of significance was 0.817 above 0.05 so that shows that the information asymmetry variable cannot function as a variable moderation on this instrument. From the explanation above, the result of the data processing is the second hypothesis rejected.

The condition of information asymmetry means that employees are getting to know technically about jobs and employees have a better understanding of what can be achieved in the area each other's responsibilities, so that there is an indirect reduction in the gap budget because the budget is right on target. Actions taken by employees as parties who have an interest in budget planning, report on consistency with the expected performance target or unify the relationship between input (input) with output (output) of a program / activity in accordance with the existing reality so that there is a decline budget gap. When linked with agency theory, the contractual relationship between principal and agent, in this case there was no problem between principal and agent because they did not information asymmetry happens.

The results of this study are not in line with previous studies conducted by Djasuli and Fadilah (2011) stated that the interaction of budgetary participation and information asymmetry positive effect on budgetary slack. But the results of this study, are in line with the study Previously conducted by Falikhatun (2007) and Fitri (2004) which stated that asymmetry information is not able to strengthen the effect of budgetary participation on budgetary slack. That was caused by clear regulations regarding the duties and obligations of each officer including rules relating to information held by subordinates that must be reported to his supervisor and the agency related to the budget.

The third hypothesis proposed from this study is the influence of participation budgetary budgetary slack is strengthened by environmental uncertainty as a variable moderation. To find out whether environmental uncertainty is a moderating variable, then the coefficient  $\beta_2$  must be significant at alpha 0.05.  $Y = -1.292 + 0.609 X_1 + 0.052 X_3 - 0.052 X_1.X_3$ . Results testing the third hypothesis with Moderated regression analysis (MRA). Based on the formula It can be seen that the moderating variable regression coefficient value of -0.052 with significance value of 0.888, moderating variables were not significant because of the probability of significance 0.888 above 0.05 so it shows that the environment uncertainty variable cannot be function as a moderation variable for this instrument. From the explanation above, though then the third hypothesis is rejected.

The third hypothesis test results show that the interaction between budgetary participation with environmental uncertainty has no effect on budgetary slack. So it can be concluded that environmental uncertainty does not affect the relationship between budgetary participation to budgetary slack in Maros Regency SKPD. So you can be sure that employees in the SKPD Maros can not predict what will happen in the future according to this proposed by Govindradjan (1986) Uncertainty is the perception of members organization. A person experiences uncertainty because he feels he does not have that information enough to accurately predict the future. In conditions of high uncertainty, budgetary participation will reduce budgetary slack. This condition causes difficult subordinates to predict the future so as not being able to obtain accurate information for predict events in the future, making it difficult for him to create gaps the budget. Associated with agency theory these results indicate that environmental information owned by agents who participate in preparing the budget, does not cause it to occur budgetary slack. This research is in line with research conducted by Darlis (2002), will but not in line with research conducted by Ikhsan (2007) where instability influences the relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack. Difference what happens may be due to the different government environmental conditions that are created as an object of research.

The fourth hypothesis proposed from this study is the influence of participation budgetary budgetary slack is strengthened by budget emphasis as a variable moderation. To find out whether the budget emphasis is a moderating variable, then the coefficient  $\beta_2$  must be significant at alpha 0.05. The results of the SPSS calculation are entered into equation as follows;  $Y = -7,682 + 02,346 X_1 + 2,449 X_3 - 0.456 X_1.X_3$ . Test result the third hypothesis with Moderated regression analysis (MRA). Budget emphasis variable is a moderation variable. Seen from the significant value of the interaction of budget emphasis ( $X_1-X_4$ ) of 0.026 smaller than the significance standard for the moderating variable or  $\rho < 0.05$ .

Budget participation with a budget emphasis has a significant negative effect budgetary slack. Seen from the absolute difference coefficient value of budget participation with budget emphasis of - 0.456 is negative and with a significance level of  $\rho$  value of 0.026 or  $\rho < 0.05$  indicate a significant relationship. Coefficient of moderation ( $X_1-X_4$ ) of - 0.456 indicates that any increase in budget participation with an emphasis on the budget it will reduce budgetary slack. The coefficient of determination (Adjusted R Square)  $\times 100\% = 0.358 \times 100\% = 35.8\%$ . The adjusted R square value is 0.358. This shows that the variance budgetary slack can be explained by budget participation with an emphasis on the budget so its influence rose from 19.4% to 35.8% or increased by 16.4%.

The fourth hypothesis test results show that the interaction between budgetary participation with budgetary emphasis has a significant negative effect on budgetary slack. This can be in conclude that the budget emphasis weakens the relationship between budget participation budgetary slack. This means that the budget emphasis is done by superiors (principal) who participate in budgeting, able to reduce the likelihood of gaps a budget that is when superiors have better information than the basics, supervision of budgeting will be better, so as to avoid subordinates budgetary slack. The results of this study are not in line with previous studies conducted by Afiani (2010) but this research is in line with the research conducted Dunk (1993) and Irfan (2016) find that high budget pressures are thus slack low budget.

The explanation above, of course, will be in accordance with the agency concept, budget emphasis affect the budget slack due to the measurement of agent performance, based on the budget in an organization. Falikhatun (2008) states that subordinates create budget slack influenced by the desires and interests of agents so that it will facilitate the achievement of targets budget, especially if the agent's performance appraisal is determined based on budget achievement. Success in implementing the budget will show good performance. The role of superiors in conducting supervision because it has more information and ensures the budget are at the relevant level to be reached, so that subordinates try to get more income, promotion, promotion, or other awards by creating budgetary slack will be avoided.

## **V. Conclusion**

Budget participation has a positive effect on budgetary slack. Budget Participation does not negatively affect budgetary slack moderation by information asymmetry. Budget participation does not affect budgetary slack that is moderated by environmental uncertainty. Budget participation has a negative effect on budgetary slack which is moderated by a budget emphasis. Practically, the results of this study can provide the implication is that in the process of participatory budgeting in local government and leaders SKPD organization. The results of this study provide an explanation that high budget participation in regional governments to increase budgetary slack.

The results showed that budgetary participation affected inequality budget, so that there needs to be more adequate internal control in implementation budget in Maros Regency SKPD. In addition, it is more selective in determining the individuals who participate participate in budgeting. For further research, it is hoped to add a method data collection, for example interviews to get more complete and accurate data. Future studies can find other variables that can influence the gap budget, such as internal control, supervisory oversight, or budget transparency can moderate the relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack.

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